Recently the urban-legend debunking web-site, Snopes discussed the etymology of the word handicap, particularly in reference to disabled people.
Along the way, they included a description of a bartering “game” called “hand-in-cap”. I had never heard of it before. I found the brief description a little cryptic. (I include it below, and try to explain it better with an example.) When I figured it out, I found it fascinating – but I’m not sure anyone else will, so it’s perfect fodder for a lapsing blog.
Here is how the Snopes description starts:
To play hand-in-cap required three people; two players and a referee. The game began with all three putting forfeit money into a cap, with ownership of this kitty to be decided by the outcome of the game. Each of the two players would then offer up an item he thought the other guy might want. The referee would inspect the items and assign a monetary value to the difference between the worth of the two things, thereby more or less equalizing the transaction. He who offered the lesser-valued item also had to pony up with the amount decreed by the referee.
It is probably easier to understand as a story:
Once upon a now, Alice has a dozen chickens she wants to barter away, and Bob has a second-hand Canon 1D MkII N camera body he wants to barter away.
Alice wants a camera. Bob wants some chickens. Time to make a deal.
But a camera is worth more than a dozen chickens, so Alice is going to have to fork over some money for the difference. How much money? No-one wants to be ripped off, so they bring in Charlie to help broker the deal. Charlie is an expert at evaluating chickens and cameras. But Charlie is a busy man, so they decide to pay Charlie an brokerage fee – but only if he does a good job. If he does a bad job, they want him to pay a forfeit.
So, all three put $20 into a cap. (Actually, Charlie could pay a different amount to Alice and Bob, but let’s keep it simple.)
Charlie considers how much chickens are worth, and how much a camera is worth, (I imagine there is a bit of lobbying done here) and decides that a camera is worth $600 more. The proposed deal is now a dozen chickens plus $600 for a camera.
Once this appraisal was completed, the two players would reach into their pockets to either draw out loose change or not, depending on whether they were happy with the proposed swap. (This change did not become part of the transaction over and above the appraisal fee; it was merely symbolic, representing a visual proof of the intent to “purchase” the other’s goods.) If both drew out coins, the exchange was effected, and the referee took the forfeit money for himself. If neither drew out coins, the referee again took the forfeit money, though the exchange was not made. But if only one drew out coins, he was entitled to the forfeit money, even though again the exchange was not made.
The coins are a furphy. Ignore those. What matters is who is happy with the proposed deal.
So, the ideal situation is that Charlie has done a good job. Both sides are happy with the price. Alice gets the camera and is happy. Bob gets the chickens and the $600 and is happy. Charlie gets the $60 in the hat ($40 profit = brokerage fee) and is happy.
If both sides are unhappy with the price, then Charlie hasn’t done a bad job. If Charlie over-estimated the value of the chickens Alice would have been happy. If Charlie over-estimated the value of the camera, Bob would have been happy. If neither side wants the deal, then Charlie has done his job but there is no deal to be made – both parties are happier with what they have than the other person’s item. So, no deal, but Charlie still gets his $40 brokerage fee.
If one side is happy but the other is unhappy then Charlie has done a bad job – he’s not found the right price to make the deal. Charlie forfeits his money! (As described, he actually loses out of the deal, although in practice his contribution to the hat could be negligible.) WARNING: MISTAKE FOLLOWS Strangely, the person who got the favourable estimation also forfeits his money. That provides an incentive against lobbying Charlie too strongly to estimate your items worth too highly, to the point that the deal is broken. The person whose goods were undervalued walks away with a $40 profit, and no deal. Actually the Snopes description says the the person who got the favourable estimation TAKES the money.
This is more than just a game – it provides a way to determining a fair price for bartering. I was impressed that the system provided an incentive for both of the parties to ask for a fair price for their goods.
That applies to Charlie too. Charlie has to be careful that the brokerage fee isn’t too high. If the brokerage fee becomes high enough, Alice (and Bob) face the Prisoner’s Dilemma: If Alice says Yes and Bob says Yes (i.e. the prisoners stay silent), they both suffer slightly (they make a deal that is unprofitable after brokerage). If Alice says Yes and Bob says No (i.e. one prisoner blames the other), Alice loses. If Alice says No and Bobe says Yes, Alice wins. If Alice says No and Bob says No, they both lose.
So, whatever Bob says, Alice would be better off saying No, and vice versa – but if they both say No, they both lose. That’s the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
When the fee is low, the prize for reaching a deal is high enough to break the dilemma.
So far, it sounds like a pretty good negotiating strategy.
However, it suffers from being fixed with secret cartels.
If Alice and Bob meet beforehand, and Alice pays Bob $30 for playing the game and always saying No Yes, while always saying Yes No herself, they each make a $10 profit from poor Charlie.
Alternatively, if Alice and Charlie meet beforehand, and agree that Alice will always say No, and to split the profit, they will each make a $10 profit from poor Bob.
Anyway, I found the game an interesting one to explore misread.
Comment by Aristotle Pagaltzis on June 20, 2011
Nice!
Comment by Alan Green on June 20, 2011
Thanks! I had failed to understand why anyone would play when I first read about the game on Snopes. Your explanation of it as a bartering mechanism rather than a gambling game makes much more sense.
Comment by Sunny Kalsi on June 20, 2011
I was thinking the same thing, in terms of abuse. However, if the brokerage cost is equal to the (individual) transaction cost then there’s no benefit from colluding. That’s assuming, of course, that transaction cost is the same for everyone.
Comment by Julian on July 5, 2011
I got an email from a reader about this. In it, he pointed out that I had misread a key point in the Snopes description – who takes the money if one side agrees and the other doesn’t.
That mistake totally destroys key parts of my reasoning, and invalidates my conclusion. I am very sorry.
(I have my fingers-crossed that Snopes made the mistake, because the current description doesn’t make any sense to me. However, whenever you find yourself disagreeing with Snopes, betting on Snopes being wrong is a losing proposition.)
Thanks to the reader who pointed this out.
Comment by Andrew on July 6, 2011
I was going to comment on the original post that this is the kind of thing I read this blog for. Adding a public admission of error represents the kind of attitude to accuracy that is another thing I read this blog for.
The changed rules give you an incentive to say yes; but they limit the amount you can feel you were dudded out of to “whatever you put in the hat”. If there is exactly one price that’s mutually acceptable beforehand, the game expands that to a range determined by the amount of money Alice and Bob put in the hat – whereas giving it to the decliner does the opposite. So you play this game to prove you’re serious about the transaction and grease the wheels of commerce. The collusive possibilities are dealt with by long-term reputation, I expect.
I must admit to not analyzing it carefully yet, though.
Comment by Bort on July 19, 2011
What is key here is that you only opt to make the transfer if you are actually ok with the deal. You would not want to risk having to trade your camera for 12 chickens over the chance at $40 in the hat, but at 12 chickens and $600 dollars you will want to make the trade.
By not pulling out when your trading partner does you are rewarded for being honest prior to pulling the coins from your pocket; this gives both sides an incentive to agree to the final deal once settled.
Since the broker also loses out if he doesn’t think both sides will agree it is in his best interest to find a deal that will make them agree.
The guy who might have the ‘unfavorable’ deal in your situation actually loses on the money in the hat, still has his 12 chickens to trade for and will have to put more money forward with a new buyer. He doesn’t want the odds stacked against his saying yes, its not in his favor.
I hope that answers your confusion on why the player with the ‘favorable’ deal gets the prize in the hat.
Comment by Julian on July 19, 2011
Bort, no, I am afraid it doesn’t clear up my confusion.
I think your first sentence is obvious: You don’t make the transfer of goods if you are unhappy with the deal (more accurately, so unhappy with the deal, that losing the ante is better than accepting the deal).
But if I fairly value my camera as 12 chickens + $1000, I am genuinely willing to sell and the chicken owner (secretly) agrees, but the broker recommends a skewed deal (12 chickens + $600), why am I being punished?
Comment by John Y. on July 19, 2011
Julian, I think what the last couple of commenters are suggesting is that the primary goal of the game is to promote commerce. Fairness is important, but only to the extent that a certain amount of fairness is healthy for commerce.
So, in principle, when the three parties enter into the game, they are all already committed (to an extent) to making a deal. Folks who renege on this commitment are punished (to an extent).
I think the fact that the broker is always rewarded for a fair valuation and always punished for an unfair one may be sufficient incentive for fairness. Career brokers who enter into this game repeatedly will develop a reputation. Those who consistently find a fair valuation will be sought after, will do more business, and will eventually be able to “charge more” (not enter into games where the ante is too small).
Perhaps it helps to think of it this way: The two barterers most likely don’t have a terribly precise idea of what’s fair, or they need arbitration because their views on what’s fair differ by a lot. Otherwise why would they need a broker in the first place? Why pay a third party if both already agree on what’s fair? So both barterers are putting a certain amount of trust in the broker to not let either of them get ripped off.
In your example, how do you know that the person with the chickens really (secretly) believes that your camera is worth $1000 more than his chickens and is somehow opportunistically taking advantage of the broker’s ineptitude/unfairness? What if you are grossly overestimating the value of your camera?
Finally, if the broker’s valuation is way off, is it really you being punished? After all, you were presumably willing to forfeit your ante if the deal went forward. If the broker is so incompetent that he can’t find the right price, then either side should, in principle, be equally likely to be the “wronged” party. Why should either of them be punished or rewarded? Well, we have to give the kitty to someone. We have already punished the broker for making a bad valuation. If we are interested in tipping the balance in favor of making deals, we should give this “random” reward to the folks who demonstrate (not just indignantly protest) their willingness to go through with deals.